individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a particular school district. It permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice among options public and private, secular and religious. 2 Accordingly, he concluded, Ohio had not unconstitutionally established or endorsed religion merely by permitting the program's low-income beneficiaries to direct their scholarship funds to religious schools.
I believe that Ohio's voucher program is sound public policy, that further choice-based education reform is warranted, and that Zelman was both correctly decided and defensibly reasoned. 4 That is, the decision is consistent both with the relevant precedents and with the better understandings of the history, purpose, and meaning of the Establishment Clause. 5 All that said, it is worth remembering that the Supreme Court's decision permitting us to experiment with school-choice programs-in particular, with programs that include religious schools-does not I.
Given recent cases like Agostini v. Felton 9 and Mitchell v. Helms, 1 0 Zelman came as no surprise, either to those who welcomed it, or to those for whom the decision is another step down a dangerously misguided path. For this reason, perhaps, the ink was barely dry on the slip opinions when commentators, scholars, litigators, and activists took to the editorial pages, airwaves, and email listservs, insisting that the "voucher wars"" are far from over. In particular, it was widely noted that, in addition to the difficult political task to come of convincing skeptical suburban voters and wary legislators to embrace voucher programs, such experiments continue to face formidable legal obstacles. 12 (Again, the Court in Zelman had no occasion to consider whether such schools must be permitted to participate, on an equal footing with other private schools, in voucher programs; the Justices decided only that they may be included, consistent with the Constitution of the United States.)" As the cognoscenti pointed out, the constitutions of nearly forty States contain provisions that speak more directly-and, in many cases, more restrictively-than does the First Amendment to the flow of public funds to the "coffers" 14 of religious schools. 15 866-68 (1992) (joint opinion) (describing the "dimension present whenever the Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.").
9. 521 U.S. 203 (1997 June 28, 2002 , at A29 ("[Plolitical and legal challenges in states still could impede moves to expand programs.... "); Jodie Morse, A Victory for Vouchers, TIME, July 8, 2002, at 32 (" [A] head are more court skirmishes.").
13. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 955 ("Unlike those landmark court decisions which terminate a government practice... Zelman is merely permissive.... As such, its significance in American life will turn very heavily on the political energies and legal phenomena which emerge in its wake.").
14. The Justices have acquired the unfortunate habit in school-aid cases
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These provisions are commonly and generically called "Blaine Amendments." 16 They take several forms, employ diverse terms, and are interpreted and applied in different ways, with varying effects. 7 Still, notwithstanding the important distinctions that can and should be drawn among the various formulations, the bottom line is fairly clear: In many cases, these state-law provisions, if enforced, might well prohibit school-funding and other measures that the Establishment Clause permits. In other words, although the Court has ruled that voucher programs may, consistent with the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, include religious schools, the constitutions of many States seem clearly to provide-or, at least, have been interpreted by courts to provide-that they may not.
It is often argued-and at least one prominent court has so of assuming that religious schools have "coffers" rather than, say, "checking accounts." See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. at 695 (Souter, J., dissenting); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 848 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 228; Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993). far held-that because state constitutions may neither authorize nor permit that which the Constitution of the United States has been interpreted to forbid, 19 at least some of the Blaine Amendments are, in at least some of their applications, unconstitutional. In other words, the argument goes, because the Free Speech Clause forbids "viewpoint discrimination" in the disbursal of public-welfare benefits through forum-like programs; and because the Equal Protection Clause does not permit governments to deny such benefits on the basis of religion; and because the Free Exercise Clause does not permit governments to single out religious practice, belief, or institutions for special disadvantage, no State may rely on its own constitution to justify discrimination against religious schools and the beneficiaries who choose them in the administration of a school-choice program.20 18 
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Others have fleshed out and evaluated these arguments in careful and critical detail; I will not do so here. 21 Nor will I attempt to describe or dissect the several lawsuits challenging various Blaine Amendments' constitutional validity." Instead, with respect to these arguments and challenges, I offer two brief observations: First, I am convinced that when government enhances parents' freedom of educational choice by disbursing financial aid through religion-neutral programs, it respects, rather than undermines, liberal and democratic values (properly understood). 2 25 What about Justice Brennan's passionate defense of rights-protecting localism and his plea that state courts correct the Supreme Court's conservative turn by using their own States' constitutions to raise the barrier between the government's aims and individual rights?2 And, did not even Justice Thomas-surely a reliable opponent of anti-religious discrimination-write separately in Zelman precisely to urge courts in Religion Clause cases to "strike a proper balance between the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment on the one hand and the federalism prerogatives of States on the other"?2 And so, a federalism-loving defender of the Blaine Amendments might ask, aren't the attacks on these provisions-particularly when worldview is that they did not think the government was required to discriminate against religion.").
25 
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pressed by those who claim to support school choice as an exercise in de-centralization-misplaced attempts at homogenizing the existing healthy diversity of approaches to educational funding and church-state relations? 2 '
I do not think so. Yes, the Rehnquist Court has done much to bring back to our constitutional-law conversations an appreciation for the role and prerogatives of the States, and for the notion that the federal Constitution is a "charter for a government of limited and enumerated powers [.] ' '2 9 It is true that contemporary scholars are taking a fresh look at the works of localist thinkers from Tocquevile to Tiebout," and that "subsidiarity"' seems to be 28 . See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 966 (" [W] e believe that each state should be free to make its own constitutional policy of church-state relations, and to extend it beyond the federal policy, so long as the state approach serves reasonable purposes of the sort associated with the regime of Separationism."). Professors Lupu and Tuttle have devoted impressive efforts to identifying such "reasonable purposes," and rehabilitating this "regime." Ira C. 31. "Subsidiarity" is "the principle of leaving social tasks to the smallest social unit that can perform them adequately." Mary Ann Glendon, Civil the watchword in political theory. Nevertheless, the better course is to treat the Blaine Amendments not as liberty-enhancing experiments, 3 2 but rather as precisely the kind of discriminatory provisions that-principles of judicial federalism and enumerated powers notwithstanding-the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment have removed from the menu of local legislative options. Even full-throated support for the present federalism revival does not require one to regard these provisions as "courageous" efforts by particular communities to provide greater protection to religious freedom, by insisting on a more rigid "separation of church and state." In fact, the Blaine Amendments might better be seen as representing the failures of particular communities to fully appreciate the nature, demands, and implications of religious freedom and liberal pluralism.
More particularly, and perhaps more prosaically, it is hard to see how the proffered "laboratories of democracy" defense can avoid foundering on the Supremacy Clause. 33 After all, federalism does not mean that the States cannot lose or may do whatever they please; it means that there are judicially enforceable limits even on the far-reaching regulatory and other powers of the government of (1996) ). Similarly, in the Catholic Social Thought tradition, subsidiarity is the principle according to which "a community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to co-ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good. 34. Absent some conflict with a constitutionally protected right, and absent the authorization in state law of government action at least arguably prohibited by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, then of course the states ought to be able to experiment, and to go their own way, in matters of education funding (subject, of course, to the no-establishment floor imposed by the First Amendment).
35. There are good reasons to believe that the Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses, would today be better understood not so much as an individual-rights provision, whose protection individuals may invoke when they are aggrieved by excessively religious state action, but as a "structural" provision that promotes religious liberty by forbidding, inter alia, institutional entanglements between religious communities and government agencies. Now, it can and should be conceded that a State's desire to construct a higher "wall of separation 3 6 than is required by the First Amendment, by insisting on more rigid limitations upon the flow of once-public money to religious institutions and uses, is not necessarily an invidious one (unlike, for example, a State's desire to experiment with de jure segregation in schools). There is no need to dispute that there might be "reasonable purposes.., associated with the regime of Separationism." 37 By the same token, though, it might be "reasonable" to prefer enhanced security and improved law enforcement capabilities over warrant requirements, exclusionary rules, and Miranda warnings. But even "reasonable purposes" are not generally thought to justify the denial of constitutionally protected fundamental rights.
Returning, then, to Justice Brandeis's tribute to local experimentation, the best response might be the one offered by Chief Justice Rehnquist in the recent Boy Scouts case. 37. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 966. Again, however, Professor Hamburger's study suggests that church-state "separation" in the United States owes as much to anti-religious ideology, and anti-Catholic theology, as to any such purposes. See HAMBURGER, supra note 28, passim.
38. Diversity is expected under our system of judicial federalism. It is problematic, however, when state courts impose limitations on the free exercise of religion that transgress constitutional guidelines set down by the Court. Our system of federalism permits states to define state rights more broadly than analogous federal rights but not to abridge those liberties
that are protected by the Constitution. At least at the level of constitutional doctrine, then, the "federalism" defense of the Blaine Amendments fails. But Professor Viteritti's statement points to another, broader defense of these provisions, one that also draws on the Court's federalism decisions: The argument of the Blaine Amendments' defenders is not simply that, as a matter of positive law, the States are authorized to experiment with a higher wall of separation, even at the expense of (possible) burdens on individuals' equal-treatment rights. Rather, the claim is also that such experimentation, and the diversity in church- This normative dimension to the Amendments' defense is entirely appropriate and, for the most part, consistent with the tone and leading themes of the New Federalism generally." Indeed, Professor Chemerinsky has observed that "[o]ne of the most frequently advanced justifications for federalism is that the division of power between federal and state governments advances liberty."" Federalism, in other words, is about more than efficiency, competition, experimentation, and diversity; it is also, in the end, about securing freedom.
So, perhaps I was too quick to reject the "Blaine Amendments as courageous experiments" claim. The present Court's understanding of federalism might seem, at first blush 45 anyway, to weigh in favor of tolerating some States' decisions to find their own way on matters of no-aid separationism. At the same time, I suspect that few would maintain that the fracturing and diffusion of power necessarily produces "more" liberty or 46 better promotes authentic human flourishing.
In any event, it equally valid concern -both as a matter of federalism and with respect to the more explicit limitations of the Religion Clauses. seems appropriate to ask not simply whether these Amendments are permissible departures from a federal baseline, but also whether they contribute to one purported "end game" of federalismnamely, promoting the freedom and dignity of the human person.47 In my view, federalism's normative content and functions provide little support for the Blaine Amendments. This is certainly not to say that religious freedom goes unprotected, and must languish, in a legal regime of church-state separation. (By the same token, religious freedom can survive and thrive in a regime of "mild and equitable" 4' religious establishments. 49 ) Rather, the claim is that whatever marginal increase in religious freedom might attend the operation of a local rule forbidding absolutely even the indirect flow of public funds to religious institutions is more than offset by the harms caused to that freedom by subjecting beneficiaries and their educational choices to special disabilities. The meaningful ability to pursue a religious education, for oneself or for one's children, would seem a crucial component of any attractive account of religious freedom. 5 0 Thus, as John Courtney Murray once of states' rights may limit the effectiveness of the federal protection. This sort of conflict between federalism and liberty is most pronounced when a rogue state or region is deeply opposed to a liberty to which the nation as a whole is committed.
Id.

See generally
Id.
47. See, e.g., Viteritti, supra note 41, at 160 ("Judicial activism at the state level is a welcome phenomenon only to the extent that it makes for a freer society.").
48 It is in accordance with their dignity as persons ... that all men should be at once impelled by nature and also bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth, especially observed, when "separation as an absolute principle"-i.e., of the kind enshrined in many States' no-aid provisions 51 -"is ruthlessly thrust into the field of education, the result is juridical damage to the freedom of religion." 52 In sum, the Supreme Court's present understanding of the Establishment Clause -particularly its awareness that the institutional and juridical separation of church and state need not be conflated with discrimination in the disbursal of public benefits or the operation of public forums-arguably facilitates and protects the freedom of religion. The States' ersatz experiments with rigid no-aid separationism-notwithstanding their defenders' misplaced reliance on Justice Brandeis, diversity, and federalism-do not.
II.
In fact, the Blaine Amendments were not simply local experiments with recalibrated church-state relations, 5 and they illustrate more than the diversity of possible approaches to funding public education or constructing "walls of separation." Instead, the Amendments were primarily the products of widespread concern about the political and cultural effects of what were thought to be the teachings and ambitions of the Roman Catholic Church, of religious truth. They are also bound to adhere to the truth, once it is known, and to order their whole lives in accord with the demands of truth.
Id.
51. This "separation as an absolute principle" can and should be distinguished from other notions of separation-for example, the idea of 
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however, that the Blaine Amendments reflected more than reactionary nativism or a principled dedication to the protection of religious liberty through no-aid separationism. They cannot be fully understood without reference to the irreducibly anti-Catholic ideology that inspired and sustained them." It would be a mistake, however, as we think about the meaning and message of these no-aid provisions, to focus too closely on Maria Monk and Thomas Nast, on the Know Nothings and the Ku Klux Klan, or even on Horace Mann and James Blaine. Such emphases would be misguided, and not only because they could blind us to real changes over the years in the Amendments' social meaning, but also because antipathy toward the Roman Catholic Church and deep-seated disagreement with that Church's pronouncements and perceived teachings shaped our culture, discourse, and laws well before, and long after, the immigration booms and school wars of the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries.
Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., once wrote that "prejudice" against the Catholic Church is "the deepest bias in the history of the American people." ' ' Setting aside for now the question whether this attitude is best characterized as a "prejudice" or "bias," there is no getting around the fact that, from the Puritans to the Framers http://www.lib.ohio-state.edu/cgaweb/nast/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2004).
58. It should be emphasized that the doctrinal arguments against the Blaine Amendments-i.e., the constitutional arguments that they may not be used to require the exclusion from public welfare programs of otherwise eligible religious believers and institutions-do not depend on the amendments' historical origins in xenophobia, prejudice, and religious disagreement. It could well be that the discriminatory motives and purposes of those who enacted the laws, combined also with the laws' continuing discriminatory effects, provide adequate grounds for striking them down. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 223 (1985) ("Without deciding whether [section] 182 would be valid if enacted today without any impermissible motivation, we simply observe that its original enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of race and the section continues to this day to have that effect."). For a detailed analysis and critique of this line of argument, see, for example, Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 969-70. In any event, the doctrinal arguments sketched by Professor Berg and others are powerful, wholly and apart from these motives and aims. [ colonists and their culture, Americans' thinking about religious freedom, and religious faith itself, was in no small measure shaped and defined in reaction and opposition to the Roman "Whore of Babylon" and all her works."'
In addition, Professors Hamburger, McGreevy, and others have reminded us that anti-Catholicism remained a powerful force in American life -particularly in the circles of the political, legal, and cultural elites-well after Blaine and the Know Nothings shuffled off the political stage. In every American colony.... specific test laws or the possibility of being challenged to subscribe to a test or oath of abjuration, with refusal leading to prosecution as a 'popish recusant,' ensured the exclusion of Catholics from public life. Even more than these statutes, a pervasive opinion that 'Popery' was synonymous with tyranny relegated Catholics to a position beyond the realm of acceptability. separationism-are best understood if placed "in the context of an ongoing discussion about Catholicism and democracy." 71 To be clear: the point is not merely that several Justices at mid-century were sympathetic to Blanchard's claims and concerns, or even that Justice Hugo Black-the lead voice in both cases-was a former Klansman who remained anti-Catholic. 72 It is, instead, that Everson's historical and theoretical premises, and the body of legal doctrine these premises inspired and produced, were both reactionary and aggressive. They reflected elite reactions to and fears about Catholicism's aims and effects, as well as a determination to counter them through law.
7
' Even twenty years after Everson-well after President Kennedy's election, Archbishop Sheen's genial television presence, and the Second Vatican Council are often supposed to have to put our Nation's "deepest bias" to rest-the "residual anti-Catholicism" 74 about whether and to what extent anti-Catholicism inspired the Blaine Amendments, not to neglect the possibility that much in the American tradition of thinking and legislating about church-state relations, religious freedom, and religion itself was a reaction to and against the Roman Catholic Church.
At the same time, we ought also to avoid another mistake. It is common in contemporary discussions of the Blaine Amendments to refer to the "anti-Catholicism" behind these provisions as "prejudice," "bias," or "bigotry." To be sure, such labels are understandable and, in many cases, accurate. But they can also mislead. Specifically, these labels make it too easy, particularly in polite and well-educated circles, to dismiss without reflection salient cultural facts and trends, and to avoid meaningful engagement with influential contentions? 9 A "prejudice," after all, is an "[i]rrational suspicion or hatred of a particular group, race, or religion;" an "adverse judgment or opinion formed... without knowledge or examination of the facts." 80 Because few in contemporary discourse are likely to thoughtfully unpack and examine, let alone defend, prejudice, bias, or bigotry, there is the risk that such epithets will serve more as convenient conversation stoppers than as useful descriptions and starting points for meaningful analysis. 1 78. See Steinfels, supra note 77 ("There is often an astonishing lack of awareness about stereotypes of Catholicism").
79. Peter Steinfels observed, in the midst of the controversy a few years ago about then-Governor George W. Bush's visit to South Carolina's Bob Jones University, that there was something strange about the fact that rightthinking people everywhere quickly and loudly condemned the University for its alleged "anti-Catholicism," when, in fact, " [ (1999) . I would add to Mr. Stern's observation the friendly amendment that the Catholic Church had, of necessity, been struggling for "church state separation" long before Murray, and the preVatican II "reality" to which Protestants reacted was considerably more complicated than Mr. Stern describes or Nineteenth Century Protestants appreciated. In fact, and notwithstanding the Holy See's frequent criticisms of the aggressively anti-clerical and anti-Catholic brand of liberalism with which the Roman Catholic Church was contending in Europe, Catholics in the United States throughout the nineteenth century tended-with some exceptions, to be sure-to campaign not for domination of American life and politics, but instead merely for evenhanded treatment. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 28, at 210 n.36 (quoting Orestes Brownson, The Know-Nothings, BROWNSON'S Q. REv., Jan. 1855, at 117) ("[The Church's] wish is to pursue her spiritual mission in peace, and keep aloof from politics, so long as they leave her the opportunity.")). New York's Bishop John Hughes expressed passionately what appears to have been the frustration of many American however clumsy and boorish in some cases, to translate into law certain arguments and commitments regarding the meaning of citizenship, democracy, freedom, religious faith, and education. That American Protestants often misunderstood Catholicism, and labored under mistakes about Catholic doctrine, practice, and history, does not change the fact that many strongly disagreed with, and were not merely "biased" against, the Catholic Church. As many Americans understood it, the Church had certain aims, and it made certain claims about things that matter. And, as many Americans understood it, these claims were false, these aims were dangerously un-American, and they needed to be resisted." To be clear: Americans' widely shared opinions and fears of Catholicism Catholics:
The man must be blind to clear evidence, who does not see the existence of a dark conspiracy, having for its ultimate object, to make the Presbyterian Church the dominant religion of this country.... Under the pretense of solicitude for the preservation of CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, the Catholics are to be robbed of both. HAMBURGER, supra note 28, at 214 n.52; see also JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 67 (1960) (distinguishing American constitutionalism from the "system against which the Church waged its long-drawn-out fight in the nineteenth century, namely, Jacobinism[,]" and noting that "the Church opposed the 'separation of church and state' of the sectarian Liberals because in theory and in fact it did not mean separation at all but perhaps the most drastic unification of church and state which history as known").
84. McConnell, supra note 23, at 459 (2000) ("[Ilt is important to recognize that the establishmentarians of this earlier era were not merely narrow-minded bigots. They had genuine reasons for fearing that the moral and cultural underpinnings of Americanism were endangered by the influx of strangers to these shores.").
85. Harper's Weekly warned, for example, that "the primary object of the Roman party is not the education of the children, but the maintenance and extension of the Roman sect. The plan is to make the schools nurseries of Roman Catholicism-a plan which every good citizen should strenuously oppose." The Parochial Schools, HARPER'S WKLY., Apr. 10, 1875, at 294. And, in the 1940s, the "ferocity" with which liberals opposed aid to parochial schools reflected "a desire to create a common culture in the midst of totalitarian foes, as well as a conviction that hierarchical religious institutions undermined the individual autonomy necessary for a healthy commonweal." McGreevy, supra note 66, at 130. reflected a culture that for centuries was saturated with the polemics and rhetorical excesses of anti-"popery," with a thoroughly Protestant version of English and European history, and with religious individualism and anti-clericalism. Still, we should not be too quick to dismiss as "bigoted" the decision to take the Church seriously enough to oppose it.
III.
The Blaine Amendments, like much else in the American experience, were anti-Catholic, but they are best understood as more than just that. These provisions should be confronted not only as historical artifacts, as evidence of long-dead biases, or as the latest hurdles in voucher related litigation. Instead, they should also be engaged as moves in important and ongoing arguments about faith, authority, and democracy; about what it means, and what is required, to be a citizen; and about the roles of education and religion in shaping the kind of citizen that our constitutional order requires. Today, the Blaine Amendments are at the center of the education reform debate, and are engaged primarily as obstacles to school voucher programs. But if we step back briefly from the arena of school-choice litigation, we can see that these provisions are also part of a long and continuing effort to harness and employ effectively the process and content of education for the purpose of generating a certain kind of citizen and a certain kind of polity.
Indeed, this effort is the focus of a rich and growing scholarly literature on "civic education," and on the challenges posed by religious faith, teachings, and communities to certain conceptions of political liberalism." Prominent thinkers argue today-as others did in the 1840s, 1870s, 1920s, and 1940s-that even a liberal state committed to pluralism, tolerance, and diversity cannot take for granted the existence and perpetuation of the values required for its health and survival. As Professor (now Judge) Michael McConnell puts it:
[A] liberal society is always at risk. One can hope that the free institutions of civil society will produce virtuous citizens, each in its own way, and believe that the structure of liberal pluralism will tend in that direction. But there is no guarantee. Liberalism is vulnerable at its foundations. 8 7 McConnell contends that the authentically liberal response to this vulnerability is to protect and rely upon the norm-generating capacity of families, private associations, and civil society. 87. McConnell, supra note 23, at 457-58; cf CARTER, supra note 86, at 35 ("[A] religious community's efforts to transmit its understandings of the world over time-to ensure the survival of its narrative-will often be most vital, and also most at risk, in the education of the community's children").
Professor McConnell has put it well:
America's founders appreciated that republican government would require public virtue, and that public virtue requires the underpinnings of religion and morality. But they also realized that America was too diverse to permit agreement on religious fundamentals and, thus, that an attempt to establish an official church would produce division and discord. The great solution to the republican problem was to promote public virtue indirectly, by protecting freedom of speech, association, and religion, and leaving the nation's communities of belief free to inculcate their ideas of the good life, each in their own way. To attempt to direct and control this insist, however, that it is sometimes the task of public, "civic" education to inculcate and shore up liberal values by countering the possibly illiberal influence on young people of churches, families, associations, ethnic traditions, and other particularistic institutions.
In other words, there appears to be increasing skepticism concerning what might once have been a core tenet of liberalismnamely, the idea that it is neither the task nor the right of the liberal state, through its schools or other instrumentalities, to tend to citizens' values or instill particular notions of the good. To many, liberalism today is at risk from the rival values being promoted by religious fundamentalists and other allegedly intolerant subgroups, in the same way that Republican virtue and national cohesion were once threatened by European immigrants and authoritarian Catholicism. In the face of these dangers, the argument goes, a commitment to liberal democracy requires that we tend to political ends as well as processes, that we "think very broadly about how liberal citizens become capable of their great office [,] "" and that we do so openly through a transforming process of civic education. This is not a new argument. What is more, the civic education debate was long inseparable from the respectable antiCatholicism of America's judicial and intellectual elites. The hopes of Horace Mann and his successors to forge a cohesive and engaged citizenry in the crucible of government education went hand in hand with their aggressive Protestantizing, and later secularizing, aspirations. The conclusion of an 1854 decision in Maine, affirming the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by a fifteen year old girl who was process-to establish a new public orthodoxy through the noncoercive powers of government-will not succeed, because it cannot. In a pluralistic society, such as ours, common values are not determined by central authorities, but emerge from the overlapping consensus of free private associations. McConnell, supra note 23, at 475. In a similar vein, Professor Galston has argued recently for a liberal politics that would tolerate and protect diversity, and permit illiberalism in the private sphere, while still defending those core commitments necessary for a functioning democracy. See generally GALSTON, supra note 23. expelled from her public school for refusing to read the King James Version of the Bible, illustrates vividly these aspirations. After stating that "[t]he education of the people is... a matter of public concern, and of... paramount importance," the court went on to note:
Large masses of foreign population are among us, weak in the midst of our strength. Mere citizenship is of no avail, unless they imbibe the liberal spirit of our laws and institutions, unless they become citizens in fact as well as in name.
In no other way can the process of assimilation be so readily and thoroughly accomplished as through the medium of the public schools.9 Thus, as Professor John Coons has written, "[t]he machinery of public monopoly" was chosen specifically by "brahmins ... to coax the children of immigrants from the religious superstitions of their barbarian parents." 91 To those inclined to doubt civil society's ability to nurture the values required for a free and democratic polity, the villain was clear: Writing in 1949, but speaking in this respect for his Common School forebears, Paul Blanchard warned that the Catholic parochial school was "the most important divisive instrument in the life of American children." 92 In all fairness, however, it is difficult to criticize liberal theorists, past and present, for worrying about the "reproduction" of the values, habits, and attitudes thought necessary for life in and service to the liberal state. 93 These thinkers have a point: the liberal state can no more perpetuate itself without attending carefully to the dispositions of its citizens than a religious community that does not evangelize each new generation can hope to thrive and survive. 94 In the words of the father of the Common School Movement, Horace Mann, "it may be an easy thing to make a republic; but it is a very laborious thing to make Republicans." 9 5 In this vein, Henry Adams once complained that education is "a sort of dynamo machine for polarizing the popular mind; for turning and holding its lines of force in the direction supposed to be the most effective for State purposes., 96 Was Adams right? Is "polarizing the popular mind," or what Professor Amy Gutmann has called "conscious social reduce or eliminate religious divisiveness or strife, does not place religious discussion, association, or political participation in a status less preferred than rights of discussion, association, and political participation generally.").
93. GUTMANN, supra note 86, at 39 ("We are committed to collectively recreating the society that we share .... The substance of this core commitment is conscious social reproduction.").
94. The Blaine Amendments can also helpfully be framed as arguments proceeding from Macedo's, and Adams's, premises. In other words, it was the question, "what should be the purpose, and content, of 'education'?" that was-along with a colorful grab-bag of fears, misunderstandings, biases, and conspiracy theories-that was at the heart of the Blaine Amendment controversies and that remains a central problem of political morality today. Although we confront the Blaine Amendments today primarily as constraints imposed by positive law on local policy choices about school funding, these provisions take us to the heart of perennial questions about both statecraft and soulcraft.
That is, the Blaine Amendments represent, among other things, the enactment into law of certain claims about the aims of education, the prerogatives of the liberal state, the proper scope of religious obligation, and even the nature and end of the human person. 99 We should engage these claims.
For example: I believe that education is "the indivisible process of acquiring beliefs, premises, and dispositions that are our windows on the world, that mediate and filter our experience of it, and that govern our evaluation and judgment of it. what attaches us to those goods and ends that attract, almost gravitationally, our decisions and actions."'° As the French philosopher Jacques Maritain once wrote, "the chief task of education is above all to shape man, or to guide the evolving dynamism through which man forms himself as man." ' ' In fact, Pope John Paul II goes so far as to suggest that the educator is "a person who 'begets' in a spiritual sense"' 2 and that education should "be considered a genuine apostolate,"' 0 3 or mission. Indeed, it is precisely because education is the process and craft of soul making, and is as much about transmitting values and loyalties to our children as it is about outfitting them with useful data and skill sets, that we care, argue, and even fight so much about it. This is why today's debates concerning choice-based reform are as heated as they are, why the Common School Movement was so widely embraced, why the Blaine Amendments were enacted, and why Paul Blanchard and Justice Douglas worried about Catholic schools. As those involved in the civic education conversation recognize, we care about education not just because we think it matters what facts and figures our children and our fellow citizens know. We care also because it matters what they value, it matters what and in what they believe, and it matters to and for what they aspire. This is, of course, why many of us cherish the right to send our children to religious schools, and also why many in the 19th Century, like more than a few today, feared the political effects of its exercise. a sectarian idea of religion" that proceeds from a "theological premise"; the "wall... is built, not by an idea of liberty, but by an idea of religion." 108 It strikes me that Professor Hamburger's recent history provides strong support for Murray's arguments." 9 Hamburger's work makes a strong case that the notion of "separation of church and state," as it has developed and been implemented in the United States, and as it was codified in many States' Blaine Amendments, is as much a cluster of substantive religious tenets than an "article[] of peace". n This notion of "separation" has served not only as a neutral means of clearing out the space in life and law required for the freedoms of belief and conscience and guaranteeing the independence of religious associations and institutions. It has functioned also as a profession of faith, a body of doctrine, and a cluster of highly individualistic assertions about religious belief, authority, obligation, and truth."' It is not only a claim about 108. Murray, supra note 52, at 30.
109.
See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 28, at 489 ("[T]he idea of separation between church and state seems to have been part of a reconceptualization of religious liberty that had particular appeal for Americans who conceived of themselves as independent of clerical and ecclesiastical claims of authority.").
As Professor Hamburger further recounts:
Gradually, in response to their fears of church authority, especially Catholic Church authority, Americans reconceptualized their religion, their citizenship, and their sense of themselves in highly individualistic ways, and, concomitantly, they redefined their religious liberty to protect themselves from the groups they feared, making separation of church and state part of their broader reconception of their individual, religion, and national identity.
Id. at 490. 110. MURRAY, supra note 83, at 49. In Murray's view, the First Amendment's Religion Clauses ought to be regarded as "articles of peace," not "articles of faith." Id. They were "the work of lawyers, not theologians or even of political theorists," and reflected the "necessity or utility for the preservation of the public peace. It is tempting to proceed from this characterization of the Blaine Amendments as codified sectarian dogma to the conclusion that they are unconstitutional. Putting aside the question whether the circumstances surrounding their enactments makes these provisions vulnerable under, for example, the Equal Protection Clause,"' it is black-letter doctrine that the Constitution does not permit government to propose, endorse, evaluate, or enforce theological claims," 5 just as it is a staple of contemporary churchdivine revelation, human freedom, etc... They are true articles of faith"); see also id. at 50 (attributing dogmatic separationism, in part, to the "Puritan" "notion that American democratic institutions are the necessary secular reflection of Protestant anti-authoritarian religious individualism"); PERRY, supra note 49, at 30 (contending that certain separationist claims "import into the Constitution a controversial conception of the proper relation between morality and religion," a conception that is, "in a word, sectarian and has no claim on the large majority of Americans for whom religious faith and moral judgment are often inextricably linked").
112. Of course, as my friend Steve Smith once reminded me, "nearly everything of any lasting significance is at some level a theological position." Email from Steven D. Smith to Richard W. Garnett (June 10, 2003, 15:28:56 EST) (on file with author); see also, e.g., PERRY, supra note 49, at 50-51, 109 (arguing that the moral claim at the heart of liberalism-i.e., the claim that every human being, by virtue of being human, is inviolable-is, at bottom, a religious claim).
113. Cf RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 82 (1984) ("Because government cannot help but make moral judgments of an ultimate nature, it must, if it has in principle excluded identifiable religion, make those judgments by 'secular' reasoning that is given the force of religion.").
114 116. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also MURRAY, supra note 83, at 54 ("If it be true that the First Amendment is to be given a theological interpretation and that therefore it must be 'believed,' made an object of religious faith, it would follow that a religious test has been thrust into the Constitution.").
117. Murray, supra note 52, at 30. In Michael Perry's words, the Establishment Clause means:
[g]overnment may not take any action that favors a church in relation to another church, or in relation to no church at all, on the basis of the view that the favored church is, as a church-as a community of faith-better along one or another dimensions of value (truer, for example, or more efficacious spiritually, or more authentically American). 
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
The problem with the assertion that the Blaine Amendments are unconstitutional because they codify religious propositions is that Justice Jackson's celebrated tribute to the "fixed star in our constitutional constellation" falls apart under close inspection. Indeed, as Steve Smith argues, Jackson's "no orthodoxy" principle "committed the Court (and the judges and lawyers and scholars, and indeed the nation) to a massive collective delusion."' 1 9 Of course, the government "prescribe[s]" orthodoxy-of a kind that can fairly be described as "religious"-all the time. Assertions to the contrary are "radically incongruent with our constitutional traditions." 12° The government consciously and purposely articulates positions, stakes claims, and take stands; it approves, endorses, and subsidizes some controversial and contestable ideas, and rejects others. Indeed, our government, in particular, was founded upon, and dedicated to, certain ideas and propositions.
It should come as no surprise, then, that-as was described in Part III-many believe it is a necessary task of the state in a liberal democracy like ours precisely to "prescribe[]" orthodoxy, through the education of the young as well as by other means, so as to shore up the values and form the citizens it requires.
In particular, it 119. Steven D. Smith, Barnette's Big Blunder 1 (unpublished manuscript on file with author); see also id. at 4 ("[T]he 'no orthodoxy' position memorably articulated in Barnette has had a beguiling but baneful influence on our First Amendment discourses-and hence on our understanding of our community, and of ourselves.").
120. Id. at 14; see also id. at 18 ("A government must act, and hence it must act on some set of beliefs; so government could hardly avoid endorsing the beliefs it acts upon.").
121 anthropological claims that can fairly be characterized as religious. As Dean John Garvey succinctly put it, the freedom of religion is protected by our laws because "religion is important" and because "the law thinks religion is a good thing."
1 If this is true, then we have reached a strange place in our consideration of the Blaine Amendments. It turns out that these purportedly secular, separationist, and religion-neutral provisions are, in fact, religious, even sectarian, arguments about the meaning, nature, and spheres of religious liberty and religion itself.12 Still, although I believe that some of these provisions, and some of their applications, run afoul of present-day constitutional doctrine, this is not why. Yes, the Blaine Amendments "prescribe orthodoxy" in religion, but-liberal protestations to the contrary notwithstandingthey could hardly do otherwise. ) (suggesting that the "internal, self-negating quality of our commitment to religious freedom renders us incapable of interpreting and applying that commitment in a coherent fashion").
125. The principal historical justification for our constitutional commitment to religious freedom was a religious rationale. The justification relied upon religious premises and worked within a religious world view. Moreover, quite apart from its historical significance, the religious Maybe we should welcome this conclusion. Perhaps, instead of ignoring the Blaine Amendments' religious meaning, or treating it as a constitutional strike against them, we could use the possibility that separationism is theology to enrich our conversations, not only about the Amendments, but also and more generally about education, citizenship, religious freedom. After all, if the Blaine Amendments are not merely legal constraints on statute legislatures' funding options, but also claims about the content and proper sphere of religious beliefs, obligations, and loyalties, then it would seem perfectly appropriate to raise constructive, yet unapologetic and unbracketed, religious counterclaims about these 121 matters in response.
It would seem perfectly appropriate to propose, for example, that the "right of the human person to religious freedom" 1 27 "has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person as is known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself.' 12 8 justification is also the most satisfying, and perhaps the only adequate justification for a special constitutional commitment to religious liberty.
See id. at 149.
126. For arguments that religious believers ought not to be required to censor or bracket their religious beliefs when participating in politics and public life, see generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF
